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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
ANGEL JOSEPH MARTINEZ, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20001128-CA 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS PURSUANT TO THE 
STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS WAS VIOLATED BY THE 
ADMISSION OF UNRELIABLE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION AT 
TRIAL. 
Due process entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial. Defendant's right to a fair 
trial was compromised by the admission of unreliable eyewitness identification testimony 
at trial. 
A. The Defendant adequately preserved a challenge to 
the unreliable eyewitness identification under the due process 
clause of the United States Constitution. 
The State claims that the Defendant only preserved the constitutionality of 
eyewitness identification issue under the State constitution and not the federal 
constitution. The State claims that ffat no point did either defendant in arguing his claim 
at the hearing on his motion to suppress, or the trial court in denying defendant's motion, 
refer to the United States Constitution or to any case applying an analysis under the 
federal constitution." Aple. Br. at 14. This statement is not correct. 
In the Defendant's Motion to Suppress Witness Identification (attached to 
Appellate Brief as Addendum A), the Defendant cites the two-part test used by the Utah 
Supreme Court in State v. Thamer, 777 P.2d 432,435 (Utah 1989). The test used by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Thamer is based on two United States Supreme Court cases, 
Simmons v. United States. 390 U.S. 377, 383,19 L.Ed.2d 1247, 88 S.Ct. 967 (1968) and 
Mansonv.Brathwaite. 432 U.S. 98, 114, 53 L.Ed.2d 140, 97 S.Ct. 2243 (1977) which 
utilize a federal due process analysis. 
Furthermore, the five factors cited by the Defendant in his Appellate Brief 
analyzing the reliability of the identification are also found in Thamer. Therefore, the 
Defendant clearly preserved the federal constitutional issue for appeal. Admission of the 
eyewitness identification testimony was a violation of the Defendant's right to due 
process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which is the 
basis for the analysis used by the Defendant in his Motion to Suppress. 
B. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the eyewitness 
identification testimony should have been deemed 
unconstitutional and therefore inadmissible. 
The analysis used to determine whether eyewitness testimony should be admitted 
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at trial pursuant to article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution considers several specific 
factors but also looks at the totality of the circumstances of the event witnessed and the 
identification. The five factors laid out by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Long, 721 
P.2d 483 (Utah 1986) individually consider the various circumstances of the incident but 
it is necessary to look at the situation in its entirety. Considering each of the five factors 
in the aggregate under the totality of the circumstances approach, the eyewitness 
identification testimony was not reliable and therefore shouldn't have been heard by the 
jury. 
The incident observed by Dikkie Jo Black, the State's eyewitness, is the type that 
would generally cause a great deal of stress, possibly affecting her ability to recall it with 
accuracy. As stated in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 780 (Utah 1991), M[p]eople simply 
do not accurately understand the deleterious effects that certain variables can have on the 
accuracy of the memory processes of an honest eyewitness." citing Long, 721 P.2d at 
490. Because of the potential for an erroneous identification, an in-depth appraisal of all 
five factors in light of the overall situation is necessary. 
The State acknowledges the five factors and the importance of using those to 
analyze the constitutionality of the identification. The State addresses the first four 
factors, but neglects the fifth factor, "the nature of the event being observed and the 
likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember and relate it correctly." Long, 721 
P.2d at 493. As stated in Long "[t]his last area includes such factors as whether the event 
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was an ordinary one in the mind of the observer during the time it was observed, and 
whether the race of the actor was the same as the observer's." Id. 
This final factor which was ignored by the State, the nature of the event, is the one 
that most adequately considers the totality of the circumstances as is constitutionally 
required. Dikkie Jo Black testified that she had been standing talking to her children's 
babysitter when she initially noticed the two men running down the street (R. 328:112). 
Black thought something was wrong and that there was possibly going to be a shooting, 
so she told her children to get in the car (R. 328:112-113). Black testified that when the 
she first observed the men running she felt a "panic feeling" and that she was concerned 
about getting her children to safety (R. 328:119). Once her children were safe, she 
characterized her stress level as "moderate" (R. 328:119). Therefore, Black's full 
attention was not devoted to the event that was transpiring, furthermore, she was 
experiencing some stress at the time which could have had the effect of altering her 
perception of what was happening. 
In addition to the witnessed event, the circumstances of the subsequent 
identification must also be considered. Immediately following the incident, Black 
described the driver that she observed for ten to fifteen seconds as a male Hispanic, with 
dark hair, white teeth, smooth skin, between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five (R. 
328:126). At that time, Black did not tell the investigators about any unusual physical 
characteristics the driver may have had (R. 325:52). Regardless of the description given 
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by Black, the photo spread that was prepared by investigators included men between the 
ages of thirty and thirty-seven, men almost twenty years older than Black had described 
(R. 325:26). The older men were included in the photo line-up because a main suspect, 
the Defendant, was over the age of twenty-five. Black was never given an opportunity to 
view a line-up of men that met her description. Furthermore, Black was informed that 
police had a suspect and that he may be included in the older photo spread, suggesting 
that a photo of the man that investigators believed was the driver was included (R. 
325:23). 
Considering Black's testimony under the totality of the circumstances approach, 
the manner in which the identification was obtained was overly suggestive and therefore 
unconstitutional. To be admissible, the identification process must be one free of 
suggestion. State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986). The circumstances and manner in 
which Black selected the Defendant as the driver of the vehicle she saw picking up the 
men thought to be the shooters, produced an identification that was unreliable and 
therefore inadmissible at trial. 
Looking at all of the required factors, Black's testimony regarding her eyewitness 
identification of the Defendant was unconstitutional as it violated his right to due process 
of law pursuant to article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
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II THE HEARSAY EVIDENCE INADVERTENTLY ELICITED 
AT TRIAL WAS DAMAGING TO THE DEFENDANT AND 
THEREFORE PREJUDICIAL TO HIS DEFENSE. 
The State argues that although there was a technical discovery violation, the error 
was harmless and therefore the denial of the Defendant's motion for a mistrial was not an 
abuse of discretion. Furthermore, the State claims that the Defendant failed to object to 
additional damaging testimony, therefore, Defendant not mitigating any damage that may 
have resulted from the State's failure to provide all of the requested reports and 
discovery. 
A. The State's failure to provide the Defendant with all discovery, 
while not willful, had a prejudicial effect on the Defendant at 
trial. 
The Defendant concedes that the State did not intentionally commit a discovery 
violation by not providing all required police reports and discovery, but as a result of its 
failure to fulfill its obligation under the Rules of Evidence, the Defendant inadvertently 
elicited information from a witness that, when heard by the jury, was highly prejudicial to 
the defense. 
While cross-examining the victim's fiance, Anita Archuleta, defense counsel asked 
if during the investigation she had given the police any names of who she thought might 
be responsible for the shooting. Archuleta responded that she had given investigators the 
name of Jose Nava (R. 328:102). When defense counsel asked this question, he was not 
aware that this might elicit testimony regarding a connection between Jose Nava and the 
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Defendant, and further that this question would open the door to such information being 
heard by the jury. On redirect examination, the State further questioned Archuleta 
regarding her knowledge of Jose Nava. The State asked Archuleta if she was aware that 
Nava and the Defendant were friends (R. 328:104). Archuleta responded that the victim 
had told her that the Defendant and Nava had called him. Defense counsel immediately 
objected to her response on the basis of hearsay and the objection was sustained (R. 
328:104). The questioning continued and the State asked Archuleta if it was her 
"understanding that Angel Martinez had made one of those calls," to which the witness 
answered in the affirmative (R. 328:104). The testimony alleging a connection between 
Nava and Martinez was heard by the jury, and because the State phrased the question the 
way it did, there was no basis for an additional objection. At the conclusion of testimony 
on the first day of trial, the Defendant moved for a mistrial, believing the Defendant 
would not get the fair trial he is entitled to (R. 328: 148). 
The issue on appeal is not whether the discovery violation was willful, but rather 
the denial of the mistrial motion and the prejudicial effect of the hearsay statement at trial. 
A mistrial motion should be granted "where the circumstances are such as to reasonably 
indicate . . . that a fair trial cannot be had and that a mistrial is necessary in order to avoid 
injustice." State v. WacL 2001 UT 35 f 45, 24 P.3d 948. When the prejudicial hearsay 
statement was heard by the jury, the Defendant's constitutionally guaranteed right to a 
fair trial was compromised. 
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The Defendant did suffer prejudice as a result of the State's failure to produce all 
of the required reports and discovery. Had defense counsel had the missing police report 
and the information contained therein, he would not have opened the door for any 
statements alleging a connection between Jose Nava and Martinez. The State claims that 
the Defendant had received equivalent information to that contained in the missing police 
report. While defense counsel did have knowledge that the Defendant had made a 
telephone call to the victim, the Defendant did not have information about any phone 
calls that may have created a connection between Jose Nava, the Defendant, and the 
victim. Therefore, when defense counsel asked Archuleta about the name she gave 
investigators for who may be responsible, there was no reason to believe that this 
question would open the door to a possible connection between the Defendant and the 
victim. 
The State's breach of its duty to continually provide the Defendant with all 
relevant discovery resulted in prejudicial information being heard by the jury. This 
information was damaging as it created a link between the person Archuleta initially 
suspected was responsible for the shooting and the Defendant. Nowhere else in the 
presentation of evidence was a personal connection between the Defendant and the victim 
alluded to. Therefore, the prejudice suffered by the Defendant was that the jury heard 
testimony that the Defendant had a direct link to the victim that they wouldn't have heard 
otherwise. Defense counsel unknowingly opened the door to questioning regarding a 
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connection between Jose Nava and the Defendant, that wouldn't have been opened had 
the State provided all the required discovery. 
B. Defense counsel made sufficient efforts to mitigate any harmful 
effect of the prejudicial testimony that was inadvertently 
solicited at trial. 
The State erroneously claims that defense counsel did not fully mitigate the harm, 
and additionally, allowed even more damaging testimony to be heard by the jury without 
objection. The State claims that any potential prejudice could have been remedied by an 
jury instruction at the conclusion of the trial, and because defense counsel did not request 
such, the damage was not fiilly mitigated. The decision to not request the instruction was 
tactical, since a jury instruction would only draw more attention to the objectionable 
hearsay statement. When ruling on the Defendant's motion for mistrial at the end of the 
first day, the trial court noted that some hearsay did come in and that she was willing to 
advise the jury to disregard what was said prior to a sustained objection, she also stated 
her concern that such an advisory would draw more attention to it than necessary (R. 
328:154). 
On the second day of trial, the court again articulated its reasoning for denying the 
mistrial motion, stating that the court is "always disinclined" to grant a mistrial, but that 
the court was willing to give "some kind of curative instruction verbally" or "a written 
curative instruction about hearsay not being something generally that can be considered" 
(R. 329:173). Again, there was a concern that by giving such an instruction, the hearsay 
9 
would be unduly emphasized to the jurors. 
An instruction drawing the jurors attention to the hearsay statement was potentially 
more damaging. Therefore, the State cannot claim that by choosing to not draw more 
attention to the damaging hearsay, the Defendant did not fully mitigate the harm caused 
by the statement. 
The State also claims that Defendant allowed additional damaging testimony 
regarding a connection between the Defendant and Jose Nava without objection. In its 
brief, the State refers to the redirect examination of Detective Guy Yoshikawa, where he 
was questioned about Jose Nava's role in the homicide. Defense counsel objected to 
Detective Yoshikawa's answer as hearsay, when he responded that he had reason to 
believe the Defendant was involved in the shooting because he had been informed that the 
Defendant owned a car matching the description given by witnesses (R. 329:269). The 
objection was overruled and the witness continued with his response, stating that Jose 
Nava admitted he was aware of Angel Martinez, and that they had gone to school together 
(R. 329:269). Defense counsel raised the issue of his overruled objection to the hearsay 
statement prior to closing arguments, renewing the motion for a mistrial (R. 331:10). 
Defense counsel reminded the court of his objection to the hearsay statement and his 
belief that the objection should have covered Detective Yoshikawa's entire response (R. 
331:13). The court stated that the rest of the response was questionable and that defense 
counsel could have objected again but because no additional objection was raised, the 
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response was allowed (R. 331:13). 
The State falsely asserts that the Defendant permitted the damaging hearsay 
statement and that therefore any error was harmless. Aple. Br. at 36. The Defendant 
attempted to object to the damaging testimony of Detective Yoshikawa, but the objection 
was overruled. The hearsay statement made by Detective Yoshikawa was not permissibly 
introduced by the defense. Defendant was harmed by the trial court's erroneous ruling to 
the hearsay objection and denial of the subsequent mistrial motion at the conclusion of the 
evidence. 
Ill DEFENDANT MEETS BURDEN OF DEMONSTRATING THE 
INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL TO SUPPORT 
THE CONVICTIONS FOR AGGRAVATED BURGLARY AND 
MURDER. 
In Defendant's brief, all of the required evidence presented at trial that supported a 
conviction of the Defendant for aggravated burglary and murder was marshaled. Aplt. 
Br. at 21-22. The State claims that Defendant has not met the marshaling burden. In his 
brief, Defendant included all "relevant evidence presented at trial" including all 
"competent evidence" as required by West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co., 818 
P.2d 1311, 1313, 1315 (Utah App. 1991). An examination of this marshaled evidence 
yields some reasonable doubt that the Defendant is guilty of aggravated burglary and 
murder. 
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At trial, the State was not able to present any evidence demonstrating that the 
Defendant acted with the requisite intent. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1999), the 
accomplice liability statute states that f,[e]very person, acting with the mental state 
required for the commission of the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, 
or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense 
shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct." Emphasis added. The burglary 
statute requires that the actor Menter[] or remainf] unlawfully in a building or any portion 
of a building with intent to commit a felony or theft or commit an assault on any person." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202. The State presented evidence attempting to show that the 
Defendant was the driver and owner of the vehicle observed leaving the scene. This 
evidence was inconclusive, as the eyewitness identification was under questionable 
circumstances and the proof regarding the destruction of the Defendant's vehicle shortly 
after the incident was circumstantial. Aplt. Br. at 23-24. 
The State also presented the unreliable testimony of Roger Ashworth, wherein the 
Defendant purportedly confessed to driving the vehicle carrying the gunmen. This 
testimony was not conclusive evidence that the Defendant was in fact the driver, or that 
there was any intent on his part for any shooters to go into the house of Jose Nava and 
commit a felony therein. Aplt Br. at 25-26. 
Considering all of the evidence, there was not a sufficient basis upon which the 
jury could conclude that the Defendant was acting with the necessary intent to commit 
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aggravated burglary and murder. As discussed in Defendant's appellant brief, the 
evidence presented at trial was either unreliable or inconclusive. Therefore, pursuant to 
the holding in State v. Giles. 966 P.2d 872, 876 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), this court must 
reverse a conviction for lack of evidence when the evidence is so inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the crime. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on Defendant's appellate brief and the foregoing reply, the Defendant 
respectfully requests this court reverse the jury's verdict, or in the alternative, order a new 
trial. j 
DATED this £Q day of j/J/WlAMI. 2002. "MIAMI. 
Gustin, Christian, Skordas & Caston 
Stephanie Ames 
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